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How is the West Failing Democracy in Albania?

 

From: Altin Gjeta 
Comment: How is the West Failing Democracy in Albania?

Nearly three weeks ago Albania held the 10th general elections since it embarked on its democratic transition in the beginning of the 90s. The ruling Socialist Party, led by Prime Minister Edi Rama won a thin majority, though sufficient to form a new government in September when the tenure of the new parliament kicks off. This will make Rama the only incumbent Premier to win a third term in the history of post-communist Albania. 

However, Rama’s victory is set to foreclose the fragile democratic life and struggling – and finally tear down the democratic façade upheld by the international community throughout Albania’s prolonged transition. In a great part, it is the international community who has nurtured the old and corrupt elite’s grip to power through its actions and non-actions only for the sake of security and stability of Albania.

Brussels and Washington’s policy, the most influential international players in Tirana, is led by the securitisation paradigm, thus trading democracy for stability. In this regard, they have always sided with the strongmen in power, as is the case with Rama, at the expense of democratic prospect of the country. Acting in a deep polarised and politicised society, the international community’s top-down interventions have only made the matter worse. 

They imposed a judicial reform in 2015 which seems to have exhibited major flaws and is far from a successful end. The inability of the international community to foresee potential side-effects of the justice reform has collapsed the judiciary power. The vetting process, whose legality is questionable, has left Albania without functioning Constitutional and High Courts for years in the middle of political turmoil. 

Amid this judiciary power vacuum, Prime Minister Rama has harnessed the trust of the internationals vested on him as the “champion” of the judiciary reform to usher a witch-hunting camping against the opposition and its supporters – put before the parliament allegedly unconstitutional laws such as the anti-defamation package, tailored-made laws and new amended electoral code just four months ahead of the general elections. He has clearly hijacked the judiciary reform and used and misused it in his party’s political benefit. 

While Rama was concentrating more power on his hands, the international community stayed aside, or confused the public more with vague diplomatic statements, and paradoxically pressured the opposition. 

Just a few months ahead of the general elections in 2017 and local elections in 2019, the opposition led by the Democratic Party threatened to boycott elections in light of Dibra and Durres’ districts scandals uncovered by German tabloid Bild where Socialist MPs and Ministers were taped pressuring public servants and buying votes.

As we speak today, the new, much heralded reformed judiciary institutions have done nothing to hold them accountable. Nevertheless, the internationals pressured the opposition to run in 2017 elections by threatening it with sanctions and recognised the one-party municipal elections in 2019. 

This further degraded the democratic institutional framework and ultimately broke down check and balance constitutional mechanisms. In 2019 the opposition relinquished its seats from the parliament leaving behind the ruling Socialist Party with an overwhelming majority. Undisturbed by the opposition in parliament and facing a weak civil society, as well as cuddled by the internationals, Premier Rama tightened his grip in power even more. 

In October 2020, the Socialist Party amended the Electoral Code unilaterally, practically changing the rules of the democratic game in discordance with the political agreement between the opposition and majority that was mediated by the international community. 

Though grave concerns were raised over the constitutionality and fairness of these changes, having Oliver Varhelyi, the Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement of the EU calling upon the parliament to wait with the passing additional amendments to the Electoral Code until the Venice Commission answered a list of issues addressed by President Ilir Meta, the package was passed. Ironically, contrary to the threats the internationals threw towards the opposition in 2017 and 2019, this time they merely expressed their regret on the matter.

It is in this dis-balanced environment the opposition competed in April 25 general elections and lost.

The OSCE preliminary report noted that “the ruling party derived significant advantage from its incumbency, including through its control of local administrations and from the misuse of administrative resources. Allegations of vote buying by political parties were pervasive during the campaign and a high number of investigations were opened in this regard”. 

Whilst the report stresses these significant irregularities, in the same page below the OSCE asserts that the “July 2020 changes in the Electoral Code were based on a wide political consensus and followed an inclusive consultative process”, as the electoral legislation is an exclusive domain of the political parties not of the whole society. 

In a polarised society with almost non-existent independent and functioning democratic institutions, this confusing and conflicting discourse has solely benefited the strongest, namely the government. It comes as no surprise that just a few days after the April 25 elections, at a time when party complaints over electoral fraud are not yet addressed, the international community rushed up to congratulate Prime Minister Rama and called upon the opposition to accept the result. 

In these circumstances, a third term in office for Rama has all the ingredients to officially establish an authoritarian, Turkish President Erdogan-like rule. He will continue to slam the opposition as the villain of Albania and cling to power through non-democratic machinations. 

Under his tenure, Albania seriously risks sliding back from a competitive authoritarian regime it used to be during the past three decades, to a hegemonic one. The indications are already there. The recent Freedom House report, notwithstanding the last elections, shows Albania’s democracy score has further declined.

The odds are against Albania’s democratic turn. And there are enough reasons the Western democracies bear significant responsibilities for this downturn. They should stop treating Albania as a postmodern Guinea pig. 

https://exit.al/en/2021/05/12/how-is-the-west-failing-democracy-in-albania/?fbclid=IwAR3v8IMmtiGZKRHSCcRU4AvbxuWTNnYqh0VLg-2PJUaawgfPO7UoHscMyUs

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